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Foreign aid flows have increased considerably during the last decades, targeting, apart from 
development objectives, goals related to democracy. In this paper we investigate whether aid 
has affected the political regime of recipient countries. To this end, we use annual data on Net 
Official Development Assistance covering 64 aid-recipients. Because of data limitations, we 
cover the period 1967-2002. We find that aid flows decreased the likelihood of observing a 
democratic  regime  in  a  recipient  country.  This  effect  is  sensitive  to  economic  and  social 
conditions. The negative relation between aid and democracy is moderated when aid flows are 
preceded by economic liberalization. Aid from the U.S. has a non-significant effect on the 
political regime of recipients. 
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Our objective is to investigate empirically the relationship between aid flows and democracy. This 
relationship has attracted considerable attention for two main reasons. First, democracy has increased 
in  prevalence,  which  is  reflected  in  studies  that  have  explored  empirically  the  determinants  of 
democratization  (see  Muller,  1995;  Barro,  1999;  Feng  and  Zak,  1999;  Przeworski  et  al.,  2000; 
Acemoglu  et  al.,  2005, 2007;  Epstein  et  al.,  2006;  Borooah  and  Paldam,  2007;  Papaioannou  and 
Siourounis, 2008). Second, foreign aid, which is oriented to poorer –and typically more autocratic– 
countries, includes non-developmental goals related to the democratization of recipients. 
The literature has pointed out that foreign aid can affect the political regime of the recipient by 
promoting democratic institutions, good governance and the rule of law. This effect takes mainly place 
through the strengthening of channels that encourage democracy, such as income and education levels 
(see, among others, Lipset, 1959; Almond and Powell, 1965; Barro, 1996; Doucouliagos and Paldam, 
2008, 2011a). Another major channel is conditionality (see for example, Crawford, 1997; Hopkins, 
2000).  
The general picture from the empirical studies of aid and democratization of recipients is not 
clear-cut. Goldsmith (2001) found a positive, statistically significant relationship between Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) from Western donor countries and the level of democracy in forty-
eight recipients of sub-Saharan Africa between 1975 and 1997. Dunning (2004) demonstrated that the 
small positive effect of foreign aid on democracy is limited to the post-Cold War period, a finding that 
highlights the importance of the geopolitical context in conditioning the causal effect of development 
assistance.  Crawford (1997)  analyzed  29  instances of  politically  motivated  aid  sanctions  over the 
1990-1996 period to find that these measures did not induce democratization. Knack (2004) used 
cross-section  data  covering  the  period  1975-2000  and  also  finds  no  evidence  that  aid  promotes 
democracy.
1 Djankov et al. (2008) claim that the effect of aid on democratic institutions is clearly 
                                                 
1 At the beginning of the 1990s, aid donors began to focus on “good governance” in the form of increased 
efficiency of state institutions and changes in the institutional and legal framework regulating the market and the 
private sector. In a parallel manner, donors placed emphasis on other indirect aspects of (non-)democratisation, 
such as bureaucracy, corruption and other harmful social activities; for instance, it is often claimed that aid flows 
result in briberies of public officials due to lack of sound public procurement and the associated discretion in  
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negative and even outweighs the corresponding adverse effect of natural resources. 
In this paper we focus on domestic factors influencing the effect of foreign aid on the political 
regime. Bräutigam and Knack (2004) claimed that the adverse effects of aid were more severe with 
low democratic accountability. In particular, excessive aid flows can hinder the solution of collective 
action  problems  inherent  in  reform  efforts,  create  moral  hazard  for  both  recipients  and  donors, 
perpetuate a “soft budget constraint” and a “tragedy of the commons” with regards to the future 
budget, and weaken the development of local pressures for accountability and reform, as aid revenues 
do not depend on the taxes raised from citizens and business. Therefore, aid is likely to impede 
democratization by hampering governmental accountability and undermining citizens’ control over 
governing parties through payment of taxes.
2 Likewise, when aid is non-discretionary, democratic 
oversight has no role (Bräutigam, 2000).
3 Moreover, in countries with high ethnic fractionalization, aid 
transfers may spur competition among interest groups by increasing the size of available resources and 
inducing corruption and rent seeking, which in turn lead to less representative political institutions (see 
Grossman,  1992;  Svensson,  2000;  Alesina  and  Weder,  2002).  Anecdotal  evidence,  surveyed  by 
Easterly (2006), shows that the democratic effect of aid differs substantially between recipients and 
depends critically on domestic conditions. 
Our study uses annual data for 64 aid recipients over the period 1967-2002 in the context of a 
two-stage discrete-response framework, which takes into account the potential endogeneity of aid and 
                                                                                                                                                         
awarding contracts. Bräutigam (2000), Svensson (2000), Knack (2001) and Bräutigam and Knack (2004) have 
examined the link between aid and quality of governance, and have found that aid increases corruption and 
hampers bureaucratic quality. 
2 Friedman (1958) has first suggested that foreign aid provided to governments increases the relative size of 
public sector activities and acts as a substitute for tax revenues; this effect is supported empirically by Remmer 
(2004). 
3 Democracies usually require budgets and public investment programs to be approved by parliaments. Yet 
despite their interest in supporting new democracies, donors tend to fund projects outside of the budget, and thus 
outside of any possible review by parliament or central ministries (Sobhan, 1996). In Ghana, for example, the 
democratically negotiated 1992 Constitution stipulated that “the Government of Ghana cannot contract a foreign 
loan without the approval of parliament.” Later the ruling party amended this to make an exception for “small 
foreign loans”,  which then allowed a number of agreements to be signed outside of  parliamentary scrutiny 
(Ayittey, 1998). Thus, the imposing and authoritarian character of aid programs can be related to the violation of 
domestic democratic institutions and is primarily due to aid dependence of recipients. On the other hand, in a 
number of cases democratically elected governments should possibly be by-passed during the process of aid 
allocation, as they have been involved in strong political conflicts in their area (e.g. the Hamas regime in Gaza).  
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is suitable for analyzing non-linearities. We find that foreign aid flows decrease the probability of 
observing a democratic regime in the recipient country. We then establish that the negative marginal 
effect of aid flows on the democratization process of recipients is not uniform, but rather depends on 
the economic and social environment of the recipient country; the more unfavorable this environment 
is for democracy, the more adverse are aid flows to democracy. These results are robust to definitions 
of democracy and aid measures, alternative empirical specifications, and sensitivity tests. 
We take our investigation further by asking whether the effect of aid on political liberalization is 
affected by economic liberalization. The classical rationale, which goes back to Schumpeter (1950), 
Lipset (1959) and Hayek (1960), is that countries that have liberalized their economies by allowing 
free trade and capital flows can enhance the efficient allocation of resources, raise income and induce 
economic development that in turn fosters demands for democracy. Brown (2005) argued that the 
potential effect of aid on democratization is greatest at the early stages of liberalization, when the 
resources  and  inertia  for  change  are  lowest.  Giavazzi  and  Tabellini  (2005)  used  data  from  140 
countries over the period 1960-2000 and found that the presence and timing of economic and political 
liberalizations affects structural policies, such as the control of corruption and property rights, by 
inducing governments to introduce new −or improve− existing institutions. We investigate whether the 
political  effect  of  foreign  aid  differs  between  non-liberalized  and  liberalized  economies  and  we 
provide evidence that the adverse effect of aid on democratization of recipients is moderated when aid 
flows are preceded by economic liberalization. 
We  contribute  to  the  literature  in  the  following  ways.  First,  after  taking  into  account  the 
significant heterogeneity of aid recipients, we establish that the negative effect of aid on democratic 
institutions depends on the recipients’ social and economic stance. This differentiation is important 
because it can explain the stylized fact that aid impedes democracy in some cases, but seems to be less 
(or not at all) harmful elsewhere. Second, we highlight the interactions of political liberalization and 
aid flows with economic adjustment in the recipient country and show that the effect of financial 
transfers on the recipient’s political progress interacts with economic reforms. 
Our investigation extends to 2002 only because of data limitations related to two key explanatory 
variables. First, income inequality, a major determinant of democracy in the empirical literature, is  
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limited by the availability of the Theil index up to 2002, which is the dataset with greatest coverage 
compared to alternatives such as the Gini index. Second, economic liberalization data, compiled by 
Sachs and Werner (1995) and updated by Wacziarg and Welch (2008), are only available until 1999, 
although country and time coverage is still greater compared to alternatives such as the Fraser Institute 
dataset. The updated binary index by Wacziarg and Welch (2008) has been established in the literature 
as a proxy for economic reforms; see, among others, the recent studies by Imam and Salinas (2008), 
Christiansen et al. (2009), Fugazza and Fiess (2010), Bhattacharyya (2011), and Coricelli and Maurel 
(2011). Thus, the quality of the data is a significant asset of the analysis and, in addition, renders our 
results comparable to existing studies of the aid-democracy nexus. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the econometric model and describes the 
data. Section 3 reports and discusses the empirical results. Section 4 examines the interaction of aid 
flows with economic liberalization. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Econometric methodology and data 
In this section we briefly outline the econometric methodology and describe the data. The list of aid 
recipients  and  donor  countries  is  given  in  the  Data  Appendix.  The  detailed  presentation  of  the 
statistical model and the main statistics of the variables is given in the Technical Appendix to the 
paper. 
 
2.1. Econometric methodology 
Most empirical studies on the democracy-aid nexus have relied on averaged cross-section data, mainly 
in  an  attempt  to  circumvent  the  low  within-country  variability  in  democracy  levels,  whereas  the 
analysis  is  usually  performed  using  linear  probability  models.  However,  cross-sectional  analysis 
within the context of linear models can be subject to several drawbacks, such as limited robustness in 
the  presence  of  non-linearities  and  parameter  heterogeneity.  Although  there  are  a  number  of 
econometric techniques to address these caveats, the situation is likely to be particularly acute when it 
comes to democracy modeling; democracy is often documented to occur globally in massive and 
infrequent  waves,  which  in  turn  indicates  the  presence  of  strong  nonlinearities  in  political  
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developments. A classical example is the well-documented surge of democratization involving Sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as Eastern Europe, since the late 1980s 
known as the “third wave” of democratization (Huntington, 1991). The social and political unrest 
witnessed in several MENA countries in 2011 provided the potential for a new democratization wave. 
Second, the allocation of aid is likely to be subject to simultaneity bias, as it may be affected by the 
donors’ interests regarding the political regime of the recipient country. The most clear evidence on 
the endogeneity of aid comes from Alesina and Dollar (2000) who state that “..countries that have 
democratized  have  received  a  surge  in  foreign  aid,  immediately  afterwards[…]  The  typical 
democratizing  country  gets  a  50%  increase  in  aid”.  This  conclusion  has  been  confirmed  by 
Doucouliagos and Paldam (2011b). The authors use meta-regression analysis to reveal the relative 
importance of competing motives for giving aid and provide strong evidence that donors are heavily 
influenced  both  by  the  recipients’  record  of  human  rights  and  the  degree  of  democracy,  with 
democracy  having  a  greater  effect  on  aid  allocation  decisions.  On  the  contrary,  the  recipients’ 
humanitarian needs are less important to donors than good behaviour reflected in the aforementioned 
political indicators. 
To  confront  these  issues,  we  adopt  a  Two-Stage  Instrumental  Variables  discrete-response 
framework, which is suitable for analyzing non-linear patterns in the data at hand and for controlling 
for potential endogeneity of aid flows. Our setup also incorporates random effects to account for 
country-specific unobserved features and to control for heterogeneity of aid recipients. Specifically, 
we assume that the political regime of recipient country i at time t is described by a binary variable, 
Yit, which takes the values 0 or 1 denoting that the recipient is autocratic or democratic respectively. 
Moreover, we assume that the endogenous regressor, namely it AID , can be written as a function of a 
set of exogenous instruments (uncorrelated with the political regime) and omitted characteristics, uit 
(correlated with the political regime). We then model the effect of aid on the political regime within 
the following general two-stage empirical setup:  
 
Stage 1: 
0 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ it it k it r i
k r
u AID a b X c Z
 
= − + +  
  ∑ ∑     (1) 
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Stage 2:  ( ) ˆ 1 it it k it it
k
P Y G a AID X u β γ λ
 
= = + + +  
  ∑   (2)  
 
where AIDit denotes a measure of aid received by recipient country i at time t, Xit includes a set of k 
observable characteristics of country i, Zi is a vector of r time-invariant instruments of AIDit that are 
excluded from the regime regression but are closely related to aid giving, and  0 ˆ a  and  a  denote 
constant terms.
4 Stage 1 is a reduced-form specification used to explain the endogenous part of aid 
receipts.  Stage  2  is  a  random-effects  logit  model  that  estimates  the  probability  of  observing  a 
democratic regime, where G is the logistic function taking values between zero and one. By applying a 
Wald test on λ coefficient we can test for the endogeneity of AIDit. Assuming that the random effects 
are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, estimation of (2) via Maximum Likelihood (ML) is 
unbiased and consistent. 
 
2.2. Data  
To estimate equations (1) and (2), we use annual data for 64 aid-recipient countries. To proxy for the 
dependent  variable  (political  status)  we  follow  Przeworski  et  al.  (2000),  who  in  turn  follow 
Schumpeter (1950) by defining democracy as a regime in which “key government office”, defined as 
the executive and the legislature, are both filled by “contested elections”.
5 Conversely, dictatorships 
are  regimes  in  which either  the  executive  or  the  legislature are  not filled  by  contested  elections. 
Contestation implies that multiple parties compete, incumbents have some probability of losing the 
elections,  and  all  parties  comply  with  the  results  of  the  elections.  Przeworski  et  al.  (2000)  have 
developed a dichotomous measure of regime first proposed in Alvarez et al. (1996) and then updated 
in Cheibub et al. (2010), denoted by DD. The reversed DD dummy variable employed here is coded 1 
for democracies and 0 for dictatorships. Transition years are coded as the regime that emerges in that 
                                                 
4  In  subsection  3.1  we  provide  an  extensive  review  on  the  determinants  of  aid  that  are  likely  to  serve  as 
instruments in the present setup. 
5 The dichotomous regime classification adopted here is superior on many grounds compared to alternatives like 
the Freedom House index that are available over a longer time period. First, it provides a better grounding in 
political theory, second, it relies on observables rather than subjective judgements, third, it distinguishes between 
systematic  and  random  errors,  and  fourth,  country  coverage  is  more  extensive;  for  a  detailed  comparison 
between DD classification and existing alternatives, see Cheibub et al. (2010).  
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year. 
To  account  for  foreign  assistance  we  use  the  standard  measure  of  aid,  as  provided  by  the 
Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This measure corresponds to Net 
Official Development Assistance, which is the net disbursement amount, i.e., disbursements minus 
amortisation,  of  those  flows  classified  as  Official  Development  Assistance,  a  conventional  term 
introduced by the OECD. Official Development Assistance includes Grants or Loans to countries and 
territories on developing countries which are: (a) undertaken by the official sector; (b) with promotion 
of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) at concessional financial terms (if a 
loan, having a Grant Element of at least 25 per cent).
6 We scale Net Official Development Assistance 
with the recipients’ GDP (denoted by AID), both measured in current US dollars, which is the usual 
weighting mechanism recommended to obtain a proxy for this form of transfers.  
A large number of control variables are used to capture economic, political, social, institutional 
and religious determinants of democracy and various country-specific characteristics. The choice of 
these variables is mainly dictated by the existing theoretical and empirical literature, and is adjusted 
according to the data availability for the period under consideration. 
The literature on the determinants of democracy usually includes income as a determinant of 
democracy level. Lipset’s (1959) modernization hypothesis is that “the more well-to-do a nation, the 
greater the chances that it will sustain democracy”. Gundlach and Paldam (2009) find a long-run 
causal effect of income on the degree of democracy. However, recent empirical work by Knack (2004) 
and Acemoglu et al. (2007) shows that this association evaporates once one controls for factors that 
simultaneously affect income and democracy. Similarly, Przeworski and Limongi (2000) have argued 
that there is no systematic relationship between economic factors and the appearance of democratic 
regimes; however, there is a significant relationship between economic factors and the likelihood of a 
country remaining a democracy. In empirical applications, modernization enters in several forms but 
the majority of studies employ the level of education (see, among others, Barro, 1999; Knack, 2004; 
                                                 
6 In addition to financial flows, technical co-operation is included in aid. Grants, Loans and credits for military 
purposes are excluded. Transfer payments to private individuals (e.g. pensions, reparations or insurance payouts) 
are in general not counted.  
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Acemoglu et al., 2005). We use the percentage of literate population to total population aged 15-24 
provided by the World Bank (World Development Indicators, WDI).  
According to the literature, democracy is expected to emerge out of a strategic face-off between 
the rich minority that is inimical to democracy due to fear of redistribution and the poor majorities 
who try to extract democratic concessions from the rich; thus countries with higher income inequality 
tend to be less democratic (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). We use the Theil index to control for the 
effects  of  income  inequality  on  democratization  due  to  data  availability  (source:  UTIP-UNIDO 
University of Texas inequality project). The Theil index provides more annual data than the Gini 
index, but time coverage stops in 1999. This limits our sample coverage and excludes more recent 
years, for which data on most explanatory variables (including regime classification and aid flows) are 
available.
7 Since income inequality is a core control variable of our model, we use the simple average 
of the last 5 years to generate values for the years 2000-2002, on the grounds that this variable is 
highly time-persistent.  
Although most of the traditional work on the determinants of democracy has focused on the 
domestic  attributes  of  countries,  external  factors  related  to  the  degree  of  openness,  such  as 
international trade, are also likely to influence the prospects of democracy through the spread of 
innovative ideas and the adoption of more liberal political systems; see Huntington (1991), Whitehead 
(1996), and Gleditsch (2002).
8 We use the standard measure of trade openness, namely the sum of 
exports and imports to GDP, to capture the extent of this influence (source: WDI).  
According to an argument broadly termed as “the curse of natural resources”, oil-rich countries 
tend to adopt less  democratic  ways  of  governance partly  because  abundance of  natural  resources 
enables the state to buy off society with low taxation and high welfare spending and thereby allay 
popular  demand  for  political  accountability.  Rents  from  natural  resources  can  also  distort 
modernization  by  spurring  the  expansion  of  national  income  without  inducing  the  socioeconomic 
                                                 
7 Another explanatory variable that further restricts our data span is the economic liberalization index (see the 
discussion in section 4). 
8 The empirical evidence on this argument is mixed. Li and Reuveny (2003), Rigobon and Rodrik (2005), and 
Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) find no impact of trade openness on democracy or assess an adverse effect. In 
contrast,  Rudra  (2005)  and  Papaioannou  and  Siourounis  (2008)  argue  that  the  effect  of  trade  openness  on 
democratization is positive.  
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changes that usually accompany an increase in wealth and that are likely to favor democracy (Karl, 
1997; Ross, 2001; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2005). To control for this effect we add a dummy variable 
that equals unity for oil-exporting countries (source: Easterly and Kraay, 2000). 
The  military  character  of  a  country  is  also  regarded  as  an  indicator  of  its  political  regime 
(Crenshaw, 1995; Kimenyi and Mbaku, 1996; Ross, 2001), on account of the major role of the military 
in the establishment, maintenance and overthrow of governments. For instance, history shows that the 
main  reasons  why  democratic  systems  of  government  are  overthrown  are  military:  conquest  or 
military coup. Strong defense is therefore required to prevent or deter conquest, but a strong military 
can increase the threat of military coup, so a delicate balancing act is required. In the present analysis 
averaged military expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) enter regressions to control for the military 
country-specific  characteristics  of  the  recipient  countries  (source:  WDI).  In  accordance  with  the 
empirical literature, we expect social divisions to affect the democratization process negatively, since 
democracy is less likely to prevail in countries that are socially divided and lack cultural and linguistic 
coherence (see Horowitz, 1993).
 We employ the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index to proxy for 
the number of competing groups and for the degree of conflict within society (Barro, 1999; Clague et 
al, 1996).
9 Due to unavailability of annual data, we use each country’s average value over 1960-1980 
throughout  based  on  the  assumption  that  institutional  factors  change  slowly  over  time.  We  then 
introduce a dummy variable taking a value of unity whenever the ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
index for a country exceeds 0.5 (source: Annett, 2001). 
According to some studies, geographic position is a factor that contributes to the shaping of 
political institutions. For instance, it has been argued that in temperate zones the climate is healthier 
and agriculture is more productive, thereby enabling a faster development process that facilitates the 
improvement of institutions (Sachs, 2005).
10 We follow this approach and we let the absolute value of 
latitude (normalized between 0 and 1) enter the estimated specification (source: CIA Factbook). We 
                                                 
9 Notice that the indices do not measure the “intensity of conflict” between groups but rather, for a given number 
of ethnic groups in society, the probability that two randomly selected individuals from the country in question 
will not belong to the same ethnic group with a higher value reflecting a greater degree of fractionalization. 
10 La Porta et al. (1999) have established empirically that the latitude of a country has a strong positive effect on 
government performance, especially when one controls for economic performance.  
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also  introduce  religious  beliefs  and  we  add  dummy  variables  to  proxy  for  Islamic  and  Catholic 
countries (source: www.adherents.com). In 2002, 38 out of 47 Islamic countries (80%) were rated as 
non-democratic according to the DD classification of political regimes. Borooah and Paldam (2007) 
and Potrafke (2011) confirm that Islamic countries are less likely to be democratic. Our sample also 
contains a limited number of countries where Jewish (Israel) or Hindu (India, Mauritius, and Nepal) 
populations are the majority. 
Another important issue is that regimes consolidate over time and become self-sustaining (see 
Muller, 1995; Barro, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2005, 2007). We examine a simplified version of Barro’s 
(1999) “democracy convergence” hypothesis according to which the political regime of a country 
converges gradually over time toward a (moving) target. Knack (2004) also included an index of 
initial  regime  to  capture  regression-to-the-mean  effects  attributed  to  the  limited  opportunity  of 
democratic countries to increase their ratings. We use the initial values of the dependent variable or 
the first available observation as a proxy of initial political conditions. This specification enables 
regime ratings to be conditional on their starting values and also helps dealing with serial correlation 
often met in the dynamic modelling of political regimes. Finally, we add a dummy variable to indicate 
the Post-Cold war period when democracy experienced a sharp increase worldwide as a result of 
externally-influenced transparent, participatory, and accountable political and economic systems, the 
abandonment of dictators from the West and the acceptance of free trade, human rights, and the rule of 
law as norms. In the years immediately after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1991, democracies increased from about 40 percent of all states to 60 percent. See 
Bratton and Van de Walle (1997), Kirschke (2000), and Solt (2001). 
   
3. Empirical results 
In this section we present the instrumentation strategy for aid and we report the empirical results for 
equations (1) and (2). 
 
3.1. Instrumenting for aid flows 
In order to explore the potential endogeneity of aid, we regress aid on various pre-aid factors that have  
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been pointed out as major aid allocation criteria; Boone (1996), Alesina and Dollar (2000), Burnside 
and  Dollar  (2000),  Easterly  et  al.  (2004),  and  Knack  (2004)  have  shown  that  there  are  several 
instruments for aid that can be used to address endogeneity problems. Specifically, there is ample 
evidence that donors direct aid to low-income countries, but also that they are influenced by the 
population size, with more populous countries receiving less aid (“country-size bias”).
11 Thus, one 
should expect a negative correlation between aid and both income and population levels. We follow 
these studies and use initial income (measured by the log of real per capita income in the beginning of 
the period or the first available observation) to capture recipients’ needs and initial population (in 
logarithms) to capture donors’ interests (source: WDI).
12 Moreover, in contrast to the altruistic belief 
that aid is primarily motivated to assist the poor, substantial evidence also points towards political and 
geopolitical factors, such as strategic alliances of donor countries, as major driving forces behind aid 
programs (see Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Frey and Schneider, 1986; and Trumbull and Wall, 1994). 
To control for these strategic interests, we use the standard political dummy variables that help capture 
the importance of a recipient to a particular donor (see Boone, 1994, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; 
Easterly et al., 2004; and Knack, 2004). These dummies include Sub-Saharan Africa (to which most 
European aid is directed), the Franc zone countries, Egypt (over the period, regarded as an ally of the 
U.S.), and Central American countries (also in the U.S. sphere of influence). 
Estimation results of the first-stage equation (1) are reported in columns denoted by (a) in Table 
1. In columns (1a) and (2a) foreign aid is measured as a percentage of the recipient’s GDP (AID) and 
estimates  correspond  to  the  full  sample  and  the  outliers-free  sample,  respectively.
13  In  these 
regressions foreign aid is regressed on a set of instruments comprised by pre-aid factors, regional 
dummies, and the explanatory variables of the corresponding second-stage democracy regression. As 
                                                 
11 There are several reasons why the size of the recipient country may be an important determinant of aid flows. 
First, both international institutions and bilateral donors hesitate to transfer large nominal amounts, as they will 
come under much greater public scrutiny than relatively smaller amounts. Second, small countries may have 
relatively higher influence in some international organizations with the most obvious example being the voting 
process at the United Nations. Third, small countries may be more willing to sell their influence, as they may 
gain more from joining a coalition than by acting independently. 
12 Notice that the fact that initial values of income are employed (instead of current ones) renders less likely that 
causality runs from foreign aid to income. 
13 We detect outliers following Hadi (1994), where the cutoff probability is 0.05.  
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expected, we find that foreign assistance is systematically directed to small and low-development 
countries. In addition, Egypt and Sub-Saharan countries enjoy more aid ceteris paribus. However, we 
find no evidence that countries located in Central America or the Franc Zone receive proportionally 
more assistance. Finally, there appears a negative structural break in the amount of aid per capita 
during the Post-Cold-War period. 
Concerning endogeneity, the Wald coefficient tests on the Predicted residuals variable always 
lead to rejection of the null hypothesis that foreign aid is exogenous, indicating that endogeneity is 
present in the data at hand. The validity of the instrumentation approach is checked by first evaluating 
the explanatory power of the selected instruments using an F-test to assess their joint significance. The 
null hypothesis of the test is that the instruments set is weak and instruments are considered strong and 
relevant if the F-statistic exceeds 10, as suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997). The reported values of 
the statistic always exceed the conventional threshold implying that the selected set of instruments is 
not weak. Also, to test if instrumental variables are exogenous, i.e. uncorrelated with the error term of 
the  probability  regression,  a  Sargan/Hansen-type  test  of  overidentifying  restrictions  is  performed, 
where the null hypothesis is that the selected instruments are validly excluded from the second-stage 
regression. The reported chi-squared statistics of the test always lead to non-rejection of the null 
hypothesis  that the selected  instruments are  exogenous. Thus,  we can safely  infer that the  above 
instrumentation method is valid and that endogeneity of aid is properly addressed within the present 
empirical setup. 
 
3.2. Regression results 
In this subsection we describe the main estimation results and we analyze the underlying differential 
effect of aid flows in the presence of non-linearities. Estimation of the second-stage equation (2) is 
performed via Maximum Likelihood and preliminary results are reported in columns denoted by (b) in 
Table 1. 
First, the findings on the estimated coefficients of the control variables corroborate Knack (2004) 
and Acemoglu et al. (2005) who showed that the association between political change and economic 
conditions falls out once one controls for factors that simultaneously affect income and democracy.  
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Trade openness, geographic position, military expenditures and ethnolinguistic fractionalization are 
also not found to affect democracy. On the contrary, the dominant religion seems to be a crucial 
determinant of political developments with Muslim countries enjoying less democracy compared to 
Catholic ones. Our results are also supportive of the democracy surge of the Post-Cold War period. 
Finally,  we find  that  the political  stance  of a  country  is  highly  contingent  on  the  initial  political 
conditions implying considerable persistence in democracy levels.  
Turning to the effect of aid on democratization, estimation results show that foreign aid exerts a 
negative and statistically significant effect on the probability of observing a democratic regime in the 
average-case recipient country. In particular, a one-unit increase in average AID (from 5.95% to 6.95% 
of the recipient’s GDP) is expected ceteris paribus to decrease the predicted probability of observing 
democracy by roughly 15% (column 1b).
14 A valid concern is, however, that this result might be 
seriously affected by the presence of outliers given that the allocation of aid exhibits large variation 
across recipients.
15 We thus replicate estimation excluding Hadi outliers from the sample (column 
2b).
16 Results verify the negative effect of aid on democracy, whereas the rest coefficients remain 
virtually unaffected. Here, a one-unit increase in average AID (from 5.46% to 6.46% of the recipient’s 
GDP) is expected ceteris paribus to decrease the predicted probability of observing democracy by 
roughly 18%.  
In addition, we investigate whether the aforementioned negative effect of aid is altered when 
flows are expressed in per capita terms. The majority of empirical studies on the growth impact of aid 
conclude that aid has systematically failed in boosting growth in the recipient countries and emphasize 
that this result is not contingent on the scaling mechanism of aid. However, the political effect of aid 
may depend on the population size of the recipient country rather than on its economy size for two 
reasons. First, a heavily populated developing country requires, ceteris paribus, more aid than a less 
populated one (McGillivray, 1989). Second, expressing assistance in per capita terms might be of 
particular importance since macroeconomic data for developing countries rarely reflect the actual size 
                                                 
14 The marginal effect of aid is calculated at the sample mean of the explanatory variables. 
15 For instance, foreign aid amounts on average to 5.95% of the recipient’s income in the developing world, but 
in some countries it exceeds 50%. 
16 Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, Nicaragua, Oman and Saudi Arabia are excluded from estimation.  
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of their economies due to illegal and other underground or unreported activities with discrepancies 
reaching sometimes 70% of GDP (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider, 2005). Therefore, we also 
use  alternatively  Net  Official  Development  Assistance  per  capita  (in  constant  2002  prices)  as  an 
explanatory variable, denoted by AID_PC, and we replicate the logit estimations for the total and the 
outliers-free sample (columns 3b and 4b of Table 1).
17 The estimated coefficients on AID_PC are 
negative and statistically significant confirming the inverse effect of aid on the political regime of 
recipients. 
Standard goodness-of-fit measures are used to assess the validity of estimated regressions. The 
first goodness-of-fit measure is the Pseudo-R
2 that indicates a substantial explanatory power for the 
models at hand. To test for the joint significance of all control variables, we employ a Wald test, 
according  to  which  we  can  always  reject  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  slope  coefficients  of  the 
regression are jointly not significantly different from zero. Next, we test for the presence of random 
effects using a Likelihood Ratio test, where the null hypothesis corresponds to Rho=0, i.e. the panel 
level variance component is not important and consequently the model does not improve the pooled 
model significantly. The estimates of Rho indicate that the random-effects estimator is superior to the 
pooled estimator at standard significance levels for all specifications. Finally, we report the percent 
correctly predicted that equals the percentage of times the predicted Yit matches the actual Yit. In order 
to  evaluate  the  overall  ability  of  the  model to  predict  both  zero  and  unity  values  we  calculate a 
weighted index of the percent correctly predicted. The regressions reported in tables predict over three 
quarters of the actual political outcomes correctly indicating a rather strong predictive power of the 
empirical models. 
Next, we explore whether the effect of aid differs between bilateral and multilateral aid flows. 
Several studies have shown that the impacts between these forms of aid are likely to be different; see, 
for instance, Maizels and Nissanke (1984), Frey and Schneider (1986), Alesina and Dollar (2000). In 
particular, we focus on aid flows by the United States and by multilateral agencies, which include 
multilateral  development  banks  (e.g.  the  World  Bank),  United  Nations  agencies,  and  regional 
                                                 
17 The results for the normalized variables are reported, as original variables yielded large standard errors due to 
extreme dispersion.  
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groupings (e.g. European Union agencies).
18  Estimation results are presented in Table 2 and show that 
the negative effect persists in the two sets of regressions. In particular, aid from the US appears with a 
negative (although insignificant) coefficient, whereas aid from multilateral agencies exerts a negative 
and highly significant effect on the probability of observing a democratic regime in the recipient 
countries. A potential explanation for this finding is that aid by the United States is far smaller than 
that of multilateral agencies, amounting on average to 0.7% of recipients’ income relative to 2% by 
multilateral agencies, and thus its detrimental effect on democracy is found to be smaller. 
Finally, to assess the robustness of the adverse effect of aid, we also performed sensitivity tests 
following the literature. To deal with sample selection and reverse causality problems, we examined 
only countries that were classified initially as non-democratic (Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008). 
Also, we removed time trending from foreign aid and democracy that could give rise to a spurious 
relationship between these variables, we examined the effect of aid in the Post-Cold War period only 
(Knack, 2004); we added historical explanatory variables, namely the date of independence and the 
nature of institutions immediately after the end of the colonial period (for former colonies) or at the 
date  of  national  independence  (for  non-colonies),  proxied  by  the  constraints  on  the  executive 
(Acemoglu et al., 2007); we examined former colonies only (Acemoglu et al., 2002); we controlled for 
prior  colonization  by  Europeans  (Rigobon  and  Rodrik,  2005);  we  used  alternative  measures  of 
democracy, namely Freedom House and Polity2 data; and we replicated estimation in the context of 
the Barro’s (1999) dynamic specification. The estimated coefficients for AID always retained their 
negative sign and were statistically significant.
 19 
 
3.3. Aid flows and the probabilities of observing democracy in the recipient country 
The  discrete-response  random-effects  model  of  our  analysis  implies  that  the  probability  of 
observing democracy in country i at time t is a function of the observable explanatory variables and 
                                                 
18 We thank a referee for this suggestion. See the Data Appendix for a detailed listing of multilateral agencies. 
Notice that, according to the OECD classification, “multilateral agencies” correspond to international institutions 
with governmental membership which conduct all or a significant part of their activities in favor of development 
and aid recipient countries. A contribution by a DAC Member to such an agency is deemed to be multilateral if it 
is pooled with other contributions and disbursed at the discretion of the agency.  
19 The full set of estimates is available in the Technical Appendix to the paper.  
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unobservable factors captured in the country-specific, time-invariant random component. However, in 
contrast to the linear probability model, logit models are non-linear in the parameters and, as is well 
known, the estimated coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal effects. Therefore, to evaluate the 
change  in  the  predicted  probability  of  observing  democracy  ( ) ˆ 1 it P Y =   in  response  to  a  one-unit 
change in aid, we scale the estimated coefficients of AID by the factor exp(w)/[1+exp(w)]
2, where 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ it k it it
k
w a AID X u β γ λ ≡ + + + ∑ . Obviously, the scaling factor is observation-contingent, thus yielding 
a non-constant marginal effect of AID on democracy.  
To highlight the magnitude of the results reported in Table 1, we explore the magnitude of the 
marginal effects of aid at some plausible levels of the explanatory variables (Table 3). In particular, we 
explore several scenarios in order to find out how AID affects the probability of observing democracy 
in both “favorable” and “unfavorable” environments (under which these probabilities are ex post high 
and low respectively) during the Post-Cold War period. The first scenario explores the effect of AID in 
Muslim countries with oil-exporting activity and high ethnolinguistic fractionalization levels that have 
entered the sample as non-democratic (case 1.1). Given these assumptions the predicted probability of 
observing  democracy  is  expected  to  be  considerably  low;  Iran,  Kuwait  and  Qatar  belong  to  this 
category. We next explore an intermediate scenario that concerns countries with catholic beliefs, no 
revenues from oil exporting activity and relatively coherent societies that moreover have entered our 
analysis as non-democratic (case 1.2). Argentina, Burundi, Cape Verde, Honduras, Lesotho, Rwanda, 
Seychelles are classified under this category. Finally, we explore a “favorable” environment that is 
similar to the previous one but with initially democratic countries (case 1.3); such countries are, for 
instance, Costa Rica, Malta, and Uruguay.
20 We also report as a benchmark the marginal effect of AID 
estimated at the sample means of the regressors. 
Column (2) in Table 3 reports the associated probabilities for cases 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3. We find that 
aid always exerts a negative effect on the probability of observing democracy. In the benchmark case a 
one-unit increase in average AID is expected ceteris paribus to decrease the predicted probability of 
observing democracy by roughly 17%. However, the magnitude of this effect varies considerably. The 
                                                 
20 The calculations have relied on the outliers-free regression (2b) of Table 1.  
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magnitude of the negative effect is larger in countries under the first (“unfavorable” environment) 
scenario (23.5%), whereas it is moderated in the intermediate scenario and is substantially smaller 
under  the  “favorable”  scenario.  A  one-unit  increase  in  average  AID  is  expected  to  decrease  the 
predicted probability of observing democracy by roughly 14% in the intermediate group and by only 
5% in the third group. These figures imply that the negative effect of aid flows on the political regime 
of recipient countries is not uniform, but depends on the general economic and social environment in 
the recipient country. The more unfavorable this environment is for democracy, the more disastrous 
are aid flows to democracy. 
 
4. The effect of economic liberalizations 
Our analysis so far has shown that foreign aid is an important determinant of democracy in recipient 
countries and that the marginal effect of aid flows depends crucially on the domestic conditions. In 
this  section,  we  investigate  whether  economic  reforms  work  along  with  foreign  aid  towards  the 
democratization  of  recipients.  Our  investigation  is  motivated  by  Fidrmuc  (2003),  Giavazzi  and 
Tabellini (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2006); these studies establish that there are significant 
interactions between political and economic liberalizations, with causality running more often from 
the former to the latter, whereas countries perform better in terms of many macroeconomic variables, 
like growth and investment, when democratic reforms are preceded by economic liberalizations (rather 
than vice versa).
21 As pointed out by the authors, political and economic reforms have typically been 
studied separately, although a bulk of anecdotal evidence indicates that their interaction is important. 
In this vein, a related question in our setup is whether and, if so, to what extent foreign aid works 
jointly with economic liberalization towards the democratization of recipients. 
To investigate this hypothesis, we follow closely Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and we define 
economic liberalizations as discrete and comprehensive policy changes that increase the scope of the 
                                                 
21 This means that, as pointed by Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Persson and Tabellini (2006), one cannot 
rule out a reverse relationship with causality running from economic to political liberalizations or the existence 
of feedback effects. This possibility was investigated by standard tests that led to rejection of the hypothesis that 
a reverse or feedback relationship between these variables exists, thereby confirming that the relationship runs 
merely from economic to political liberalizations.  
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market in allocating goods and services. We use the dataset compiled by Sachs and Werner (1995) and 
updated by Wacziarg and Welch (2008) to capture economic liberalizations. The dataset is available 
until 1999, which restricts our sample to the 1967-1999 period.
22 According to the definition put 
forward by these authors, a country is considered closed to international trade if one of the following 
conditions holds: (i) average tariffs exceed 40%, (ii) non-tariff barriers exceed 40% of imports, (iii) 
the  black  market  premium  on  the  exchange  rate  exceeds  20%,  (iv)  exports  are  to  a  large  extent 
controlled by a state monopoly.
23 In turn, we refer to an economic liberalization as the event of the 
country becoming open (in which case none of these conditions holds), given that it was closed in the 
previous year.  
Since  our  aim  is  to  investigate  whether  foreign  aid  works  in  conjunction  with  economic 
liberalizations, the latter are introduced with a five-year lag both individually and in the form of an 
interaction term with foreign aid. Table 4 presents the results. Specification (1) shows, first, that 
accounting for the effect of economic liberalizations does not affect the negative effect of foreign aid. 
Second, economic liberalizations enter with a negative and statistically significant coefficient in the 
estimated regression. However, their interaction effect with aid is significantly positive indicating that 
the net effect of AID will differ between liberalized and non-liberalized economies.  
In particular, given the negative coefficient of AID and the positive sign of the interaction term, 
we expect that AID should damage democracy at a greater extent in economically non-liberalized 
countries than in liberalized ones. To further explore this empirical finding, in Table 3 we compare the 
probability change in democratisation between non-liberalized and liberalized countries over the 1967-
1999 period (rows 2.1 and 2.2). In countries where economic liberalization has taken place, a one-unit 
increase in AID decreases the predicted probability of observing democracy by approximately 13%. In 
                                                 
22 The data are available at www.stanford.edu/~wacziarg/downloads/liberalization.xls. Another measurement of 
economic liberalization is available through the Economic Freedom of the World Indexes provided by the Fraser 
Institute. These indicators cover a wide spectrum of economic freedom areas, apart from international trade, such 
as  personal  choice,  voluntary  exchange,  freedom  to  compete,  and  security  of  privately  owned  property. 
However, the Fraser dataset is available from 1970 to 2000 only on a five year basis. 
23 A country is also considered closed if it has a socialist economic system, which does not apply to our case. 
Notice that after the inclusion of economic liberalization in the estimated regression, trade openness becomes -as 
expected- statistically insignificant. We thus omit the latter variable from the estimated specification without any 
significant change in the rest of the results.  
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contrast, in countries where no economic liberalization has taken place, a one-unit increase in AID 
decreases the predicted probability of observing democracy by approximately 38%. Hence, we find 
that aid is roughly three times more disastrous for democracy in a country under a non-liberalized 
economic environment. 
Finally,  as  an  additional  robustness  test  of  the  previous  finding  we  run  two  separate  logit 
regressions corresponding to observations where the economic liberalization dummy equals unity and 
zero respectively (see columns (2) and (3) of Table 4). We then perform a Wald test on the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of AID are not statistically different between the two populations. 
Since the chi-square statistic of the test equals 4.22 (critical value: 3.84) we can safely reject the null 
hypothesis.  Evidently,  aid  flows  exert  a  statistically  significant  differential  (smaller)  effect  on 
democratization in countries that have opened up their economy. 
  
5. Conclusions 
We have investigated empirically the effect of foreign aid on the political regime of the recipients. We 
addressed this issue within the context of a two-stage binary response model that allowed for non-
linearities in the process of democratization as well as for the endogeneity of aid allocation. Using a 
sample of 64 aid recipients for the period 1967-2002, we found considerable evidence that aid flows 
affect negatively the probability of observing democracy in recipients. This result is robust to the 
distributional assumptions, the choice of the controls set, the presence of outliers, the definition of 
democracy, the scaling of aid flows, and the sample selection. We also established that the negative 
effect of aid flows on the political regime of recipients is more intense in unfavorable environments 
for democracy, but is moderated when aid flows are preceded by economic liberalization. Finally, aid 
from the U.S. has a non-significant effect on the political regime of the recipients, whereas aid from 
multilateral agencies has a negative and statistically significant effect.    
There are a number of possible explanations for our results. It is often argued that aid assists 
autocratic regimes in maintaining power (often by simply symbolizing the approbation and active 
support by a foreign power) or hinders good governance by triggering government inefficiency and 
corruption in the public sector. In practice, foreign aid produces a revenue flow that may generate  
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corruption,  rent-seeking  activities,  and  civil  wars.  People  in  power  will  engage  in  rent-seeking 
activities in order to appropriate these windfall resources and as a result will try to exclude others from 
engaging  in  the  government  decision-making  process;  hence,  political  institutions  become  less 
democratic and less consensual. On the other hand, the evidence on the reduction of the negative effect 
of aid when the recipient has reformed its economy implies that, in a more competitive environment in 
which the private sector is relatively more effective, the adverse mechanisms triggered by aid inflows 
can be largely eliminated. 
Another reason for aid failure is related to the dysfunction and corruption of the public sector and 
its ties with government (Hayek, 1945; Abed and Gupta, 2002; Prokopijevic 2006; Easterly, 2009). 
Perhaps effectiveness of aid can be increased by engagement of the private sector, such as private 
voluntary organizations (PVOs), consulting firms and other business units, in the aid industry. The 
role of the private sector has been very important in carrying out aid programs. CARE/USA, for 
example, a PVO, manages over 600 projects in 73 countries funded by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). 
As in existing empirical literature, we did not attempt to identify the mechanisms through which 
aid hampers the political regime. Despite our finding of robustness of the negative effect of total aid, it 
is possible that some aid categories have not adversely affected democracy in recipients. Foreign aid 
encompassed  activities  such  as  infrastructure  financing,  support  for  education  and  health,  and 
environmental improvement. Some forms of aid are more vulnerable to misuse by autocratic regimes 
and may be directed to activities that ensure the sustainability of the regime rather than the welfare of 
the population; see Gupta et al. (2001), Gupta et al. (2002). Finkel et al. (2007) focused on democracy 
and  governance  related,  rather  than  total,  assistance  provided  via  the  United  States  Agency  for 
International Development (USAID) and found that it promoted the democratization of recipients. A 
disaggregated analysis of the democratic effect of aid seems therefore warranted and the empirical 








Data Set 1.a (64 countries): 
Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina 
Faso,  Burundi,  Cameroon,  Cape  Verde,  Central  African  Republic,  Chile,  Cote  d’  Ivoire, 
Cyprus,  Ecuador,  Egypt,  Fiji,  Ghana,  Guatemala, Honduras,  India,  Indonesia,  Iran,  Israel, 
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Morocco,  Mozambique,  Namibia,  Nepal,  Nicaragua,  Nigeria,  Oman,  Pakistan,  Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
Data Set 1.b (57 countries) includes Data Set 1.a minus: 




1. Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Korea, 
Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden,  Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States and the Commission of the European Communities 
2. Multilateral Agencies: African Development Bank (AfDB), African Development Fund 
(AfDF),  Asian  Development  Fund  (AsDF),  Asian  Development  Bank  (AsDB),  Caribbean 
Development Bank (CarDB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
European Commission (EC), Global Environment Facility (GEF), Global Fund for AIDS, TB 
and Malaria (GFATM), Montreal Protocol, Nordic Development Fund, International Bank for 
Reconstruction  and  Development  (IBRD),  International  Development  Association  (IDA), 
Inter-American  Development  Bank  (IDB),  IDB  Spec.  Fund,  IMF  Trust  Fund,  IMF, 
International  Fund  for  Agricultural  Development  (IFAD),  United  Nations  Development 
Programme  (UNDP),  United  Nations  Population  Fund  (UNFPA),  United  Nations  High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United 
Nations  Relief  and  Works  Agency  (UNRWA),  United  Nations  Transitional  Authority 
(UNTA), World Food Programme (WFP), Council of Europe, Arab Agencies,  
3. Non-DAC member countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Turkey, Arab Countries.  
  22
References 
Abed,  G.T.,  Gupta,  S.  (Eds.),  2002.  Governance,  Corruption,  and  Economic  Performance. 
International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C.  
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A., Johnson, S., 2002. Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in 
the making of the modern world income distribution. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118, 1231-
1294. 
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J.A., Yared, P., 2005. From education to democracy? American 
Economic Review 95, 44-49. 
Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J.A., 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge U.K.  
Acemoglu,  D.,  Johnson,  S.,  Robinson  J.A.,  Yared,  P.,  2007.  Income  and  democracy.  American 
Economic Review 98, 808-842. 
Alesina, A., Dollar, D., 2000. Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal of Economic Growth 
5, 33-63. 
Alesina, A., Weder, B., 2002. Do corrupt governments receive less foreign aid? American Economic 
Review 92, 1126-1137.  
Almond, G., Powell, G.B., 1965. Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Little, Brown, 
Boston. 
Alvarez,  M.E.,  Cheibub,  J.A.,  Limongi,  F.,  Przeworski,  A.,  1996.  Classifying  political  regimes. 
Studies in Comparative international Development 31, 3-36. 
Annett,  A.,  2001.  Social  fractionalization,  political  instability,  and  the  size  of  government. 
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 48, 561-592. 
Ayittey, G., 1998. Africa in Chaos. St. Martin’s Press, New York. 
Bhattacharyya, S., 2008. Trade liberalization and institutional development. Working Paper, Arndt-
Corden Department of Economics, Australian National University, Canberra.  
Borooah, V.K., Paldam, M., 2007. Why is the world short of democracy?: A cross-country analysis of 
barriers to representative government. European Journal of Political Economy 23, 582-604. 
Barro, R.J., 1996. Democracy and growth. Journal of Economic Growth 1, 1-27. 
Barro, R.J., 1999. Determinants of democracy. Journal of Political Economy 6, S158-S183. 
Boone, P., 1996. Politics and the effectiveness of foreign aid, European Economic Review 40, 289-
329.  
Bratton,  M.,  van  de  Walle,  N.,  1997.  Democratic  Experiments  in  Africa:  Regime  Transitions  in 
Comparative Perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK. 
Bräutigam,  D.,  2000.  Aid  Dependence  and  Governance.  Almqvist  and  Wiksell  International, 
Stockholm. 
Bräutigam,  D.,  Knack,  S,  2004.  Foreign  aid,  institutions,  and  governance  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa. 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, 255-285. 
Brown, S., 2005. Foreign aid and democracy promotion: Lessons from Africa. European Journal of 
Development Research 17, 179-198.  
Burnside, C., Dollar, D., 2000. Aid, policies, and growth. American Economic Review 90, 847-88. 
Cheibub, J.A., Gandhi, J., Vreeland, J.R., 2010. Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice 
143, 67-101. 
Christiansen, L.E., Schindler, M., Tressel, T., 2009. Growth and structural reforms: A new assessment. 
IMF working paper 09/284. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
Clague, C., Keefer, P., Knack, S., Olson, M., 1996. Property and Contract Rights under Autocracy and  
  23
Democracy. Journal of Economic Growth 1, 243-276. 
Coricelli, F., Maurel, M., 2011. Growth and crisis in transition: A comparative perspective. Review of 
International Economics 19, 49-64. 
Crawford, G., 1997. Foreign aid and political conditionality: Issues of effectiveness and consistency. 
Democratisation 4, 69-108. 
Crenshaw, E.M., 1995. Democracy and demographic inheritance: The influence of modernity and 
proto-modernity on political and civil rights, 1965 to 1980. American Sociological Review 60, 
702-718. 
Djankov, S., Montalvo, J.G., Reynal-Querol, M., 2006. The curse of aid. Journal of Economic Growth 
13, 169-194. 
Doucouliagos, H., Paldam, M., 2008. Aid effectiveness on growth: A meta study. European Journal of 
Political Economy 24, 1-24. 
Doucouliagos, H., Paldam, M., 2011a. The ineffectiveness of development aid on growth: An update. 
European Journal of Political Economy 27, 399-404. 
Doucouliagos, H., Paldam, M., 2011b. Does development aid reward good behavior? A meta-analysis 
of  the  effects  of  human  rights  and  democracy.  Paper  presented  at  the  2011  European  Public 
Choice Society Conference, Rennes. 
Dunning,  T.,  2004.  Conditioning  the  effects  of  aid:  Cold  War  politics,  donor  credibility,  and 
democracy in Africa. International Organization 58, 409-423. 
Easterly, W., 2006. The White Man’s Burden: Why the West Efforts to Aid the Rest of the World 
Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Easterly, W., 2009. Can the West save Africa? Journal of Economic Literature 47, 373-447. 
Easterly, W., Kraay, A., 2000. Small states, small problems?, Income, growth, and volatility in small 
states. World Development 28, 2013-2027. 
Easterly, W., Levine, R., Roodman, D., 2004. New data, new doubts: A comment on Burnside and 
Dollar’s “Aid, policies, and growth. American Economic Review 94, 774-780.  
Epstein, D., Bates, R., Goldstone, J., Kristensen, I., O’Halloran, S., 2006. Democratic transitions. 
American Journal of Political Science 50, 551-569. 
Feng, Y., Zak, P.J., 1999. The determinants of democratic transitions. Journal of Conflict Resolution 
43, 162-177. 
Fidrmuc,  J.,  2003.  Economic  reform,  democracy  and  growth  during  post-communist  transition.  
European Journal of Political Economy 19, 583-604. 
Finkel,  S.E,  Pérez-Liñán,  A.,  Seligson,  M.A.,  2007.  The  Effects  of  U.S.  Foreign  Assistance  on 
Democracy Building, 1990-2003. World Politics 59, 404-439.  
Frey,  B.,  Schneider,  F.,  1986.  Competing  models  of  international  lending  activity.  Journal  of 
Development Economics 20, 225-45. 
Friedman, M., 1958. Foreign economic aid: Means and objectives. Yale Review 47, 500-516. 
Fugazza, M., Fiess, N., 2010. Trade liberalisation and informality: New stylised facts. United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, New York NY. 
Giavazzi,  F.,  Tabellini,  G.,  2005.  Economic  and  political  liberalizations.  Journal  of  Monetary 
Economics 52, 1297-1330. 
Gleditsch, K.S., 2002. All International Politics is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and 
Democratization. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor. 
Goldsmith, A., 2001. Foreign aid and statehood in Africa. International Organization 55, 123-148. 
Grossman, H.I., 1992. Foreign aid and insurrection. Defense Economics 3, 275-288.  
  24
Gupta,  S.,  de  Mello,  L.,  Sharan,  R.,  2001.  Corruption  and  military  spending.  
European Journal of Political Economy, 17, 749-777. 
Gupta,  S.,  Verhoeven  M.,  Tiongson  E.R.,  2002.  The  effectiveness  of  government  spending  on 
education and health care in developing and transition economies. European Journal of Political 
Economy 18, 717-737. 
Gundlach, E., Paldam, M., 2009. A farewell to critical junctures: Sorting out long-run causality of 
income and democracy. European Journal of Political Economy 25, 340-354. 
Hadi, A.S., 1994. A modification of a method for the detection of outliers in multivariate samples. 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 56, 393-396.  
Hayek, F.A., 1945. The use of knowledge in society. American Economic Review 35, 519-530. 
Hayek, F.A., 1960. The Constitution of Liberty. University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL.  
Hopkins,  R.F.,  2000.  Political  economy  of  foreign  aid.  In:  Tarp,  F.,  (Ed.),  Foreign  Aid  and 
Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future. Routledge, London. 
Horowitz, D.L., 1993. Democracy in divided societies. Journal of Democracy 4, 18-38. 
Huntington, S., 1991. The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century. University of 
Oklahoma Press, Norman. 
Imam, P., Salinas, G., 2008. Explaining episodes of growth accelerations, decelerations, and collapses 
in Western Africa. IMF Working Paper 08/287. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC. 
Jensen, N., Wantchekon, L., 2005. Resource wealth and political regimes in Africa. Comparative 
Political Studies 37, 316-841. 
Karl, T.L. 1997. The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States. University of California Press, 
Berkeley CA.  
Kharas,  H.,  2010.  Can  aid  catalyze  development?  The  2010  Brookings  Blum  Roundtable  Policy 
Briefs.  The Brookings Institute, Washington DC.  
Kimenyi, M.S., Mbaku, J.M., 1996. Rents, military elites, and political democracy. European Journal 
of Political Economy 11, 699-708. 
Kirschke, L., 2000. Informal repression, zero-sum politics and late third wave transitions. Journal of 
Modern African Studies 38, 383-405.  
Knack, S., 2001. Aid dependence and the quality of governance: A cross-country empirical analysis. 
Southern Economic Journal 68, 310-329. 
Knack, S., 2004. Does foreign aid promote democracy? International Studies Quarterly 48, 251-266. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1999. The quality of government. Journal 
of Law, Economics and Organization 15, 222-279. 
Li, Q., Reuveny, A., 2003. Economic globalization and democracy: An empirical analysis. British 
Journal of Political Science 33, 29-54.  
Lipset,  S.M.,  1959.  Some  social  requisites  of  democracy:  Economic  development  and  political 
legitimacy. American Political Science Review 53, 69-105. 
Maizels, A., Nissanke, M.K., 1984. Motivations for aid to developing countries. World Development 
12, 879-900. 
McGillivray, M., 1989. The allocation of aid among developing countries: A multi-donor analysis 
using a per capita aid index. World Development 17, 61-68. 
Muller, E., 1995. Economic determinants of democracy. American Sociological Review 60, 966-982. 
Nunnenkamp, P., Weingarth, J., Weisser, J., 2009. Is NGO aid not so different after all? Comparing 
the allocation of Swiss aid by private and official donors. European Journal of Political Economy 
25, 422-438.  
  25
Ofosu-Appiah, B., 2003. Making NGO's more effective and responsive in a globalized world. UN 
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) working paper. United Nations, New York NY. 
Papaioannou,  E.,  Siourounis,  G.,  2008.  Economic  and  social  factors  driving  the  third  wave  of 
democratization. Journal of Comparative Economics 36, 365-387. 
Persson, T., Tabellini, G., 2006. Democracy and development: The devil in the details. American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 96, 319-324. 
Potrafke, N., 2011. Islam and democracy. Public Choice DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9741-3. 
Prokopijević, M., 2007. Why foreign aid fails. PANOECONOMICUS 1, 29-51. 
http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/1452-595X/2007/1452-595X0701029P.pdf 
Przeworski,  A.,  Alvarez,  M.E.,  Cheibub,  J.A.,  Limongi  F.,  2000.  Democracy  and  Development: 
Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge University Press, New 
York NY. 
Remmer, K.L., 2004, Does foreign aid promote the expansion of government? American Journal of 
Political Science 48, 77-92. 
Rigobon,  R.,  Rodrik,  D.,  2005.  Rule  of  law,  democracy,  openness,  and  income:  Estimating  the 
interrelationships. Economics of Transition 13, 533-564. 
Ross, M.L., 2001. Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics 53, 325-361. 
Rudra, N., 2005. Globalization and the strengthening of democracy in the developing world. American 
Journal of Political Science 49, 704-730. 
Sachs, J.D., 2005.  The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time. Penguin, New York NY. 
Sachs, J.D., Werner, A., 1995. Economic reform and the process of global integration. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity 1, 1-95. 
Schneider,  F.,  2005.  Shadow  economies  around  the  world:  what  do  we  really  know?.  European 
Journal of Political Economy 21, 598-642. 
Schneider,  F.,  Enste,  D.H.,  2000.  Shadow  economy:  Size,  causes,  and  consequences.  Journal  of 
Economic Literature 38, 77-114. 
Schumpeter, J., 1950. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper Torchbooks, New York. 
Sobhan,  R.,  1996.  Aid  dependence  and  donor  policy:  The  case  of  Tanzania  with  lessons  from 
Bangladesh’s  experience.  The  University  Press  Limited,  Centre  for  Policy  Dialogue:  Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. 
Solt,  F.,  2001.  Institutional  effects  on  democratic  transitions:  Neo-patrimonial  regimes  in  Africa, 
1989-1994. Studies in Comparative International Development 36, 82-91. 
Staiger, D., Stock, J., 1997. Instrumental variables regression with weak instruments. Econometrica 
65, 557-586. 
Svensson, J., 1999. Aid, growth and democracy. Economics and Politics 11, 275-297. 
Svensson, J., 2000. Foreign aid and rent-seeking. Journal of International Economics 51, 437-461. 
Reprinted in Congleton, R.D., Hillman, A.L., Konrad, K.A., 2008. 40 Years of Research on Rent 
Seeking 2, Applications: Rent Seeking in Practice. Springer, Heidelberg, pp. 165-189. 
Trumbull, W.N., Wall H.J., 1994. Estimating aid allocation criteria with panel data. Economic Journal 
104, 876-882. 
Wacziarg, R., Welch, K.H., 2008. Trade liberalization and growth: New evidence. The World Bank 
Economic Review 22, 187-231. 
Whitehead, L., 1996. Three international dimensions of democratization. In Whitehead, L. (Ed.), The 
International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
  26
ΤABLE 1. The effect of foreign aid on the political regime 
 
Variables  (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  (4a)  (4b) 
AID    -0.33**    -0.28**         
  (0.14)    (0.14)         
AID_PC 
          -3.61**    -4.09** 
          (1.84)    (2.08) 
Initial GDP   -3.20***    -3.08***    -0.02    -0.04**   
(0.46)    (0.46)    (0.05)    (0.02)   




-0.32***    -0.26*** 
 
(0.40)    (0.26)    (0.04)    (0.01)   
Sub-Saharan Africa 
4.23***    3.70***    -0.11***    0.02**   
(0.61)    (0.47)    (0.02)    (0.01)   
Egypt 
3.32***   
Dropped 
  0.02**   
Dropped 
 
(1.04)      (0.01)     
Central America 
-1.92***    -3.30***    -0.08***    -0.01   
(0.67)    (0.42)    (0.02)    (0.01)   
Franc Zone  -2.68***    -0.76    -0.11***    -0.03***   
(0.75)    (0.56)    (0.02)    (0.01)   
Literacy Rate  -0.12***  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.07**  -0.02  1.41***  -0.03***  1.09*** 
(0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.41)  (0.01)  (0.40) 
Trade Openness 
0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.21***  0.99*  0.08***  0.63 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.05)  (0.56)  (0.01)  (0.39) 
Military Expenditures  0.07  -0.05  -0.35***  -0.46  0.11**  -0.11  0.02  -1.44 
(0.06)  (0.22)  (0.11)  (0.35)  (0.05)  (0.80)  (0.02)  (1.19) 
Oil Exporting activity  -3.02***  -3.35  0.06  -1.69  -0.18***  -1.43*  -0.03***  -0.70 
(0.42)  (2.11)  (0.32)  (1.95)  (0.03)  (0.75)  (0.00)  (0.64) 
Income inequality  0.06  -0.11*  0.25***  -0.04  -0.01  -0.16  0.05***  0.30 
(0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.23)  (0.01)  (0.27) 
Muslim Dummy  0.34  -4.33***  2.05***  -2.84**  -0.00  -1.81***  0.05***  -1.17** 
(0.40)  (1.31)  (0.32)  (1.26)  (0.03)  (0.60)  (0.01)  (0.57) 
Catholic Dummy   2.52***  2.30*  2.83***  2.64**  -0.14***  -0.23  -0.01  0.25 
(0.45)  (1.27)  (0.38)  (1.27)  (0.03)  (0.62)  (0.01)  (0.58) 
Ethnolinguistic  
Fractionalization 
0.83**  0.61  1.57***  1.11  -0.09**  -0.13  0.05***  0.78 
(0.41)  (1.29)  (0.35)  (1.31)  (0.04)  (0.68)  (0.01)  (0.60) 
Latitude 
-0.17  0.16  0.34  0.69  -0.13***  0.04  0.05***  0.87 
(0.25)  (0.61)  (0.21)  (0.63)  (0.04)  (0.54)  (0.01)  (0.55)  
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ΤABLE 1. (continued) 
 
Post-Cold War Period  0.99*  1.40***  0.16  0.95**  -0.12***  0.93***  -0.06***  1.08*** 
(0.60)  (0.39)  (0.44)  (0.38)  (0.03)  (0.29)  (0.01)  (0.20) 
Initial Political Regime 
-1.71***  6.28***  -1.26***  5.16***  0.07***  2.71***  -0.01  1.99*** 
(0.29)  (1.39)  (0.20)  (1.33)  (0.02)  (0.53)  (0.01)  (0.49) 
Predicted residuals 
  0.34**    0.32**    3.54*    4.02* 
  (0.14)    (0.15)    (1.91)    (2.26) 
No of countries (observations)  64 (1832)  57 (1537)  66 (1874)  57 (1582) 
F-statistic of excluded instruments   61.01    124.02    15.64    100.59   
Sargan-Hansen Χ
2 statistic (Prob)    10.86 
(0.06)    3.71 
(0.45)    4.32 
(0.50)    5.95 
(0.20) 
Second-Stage Χ
2 (Prob)    225.37 
(0.00)    204.61 
(0.00)    213.19 
(0.00)    198.29 
(0.00) 
Rho - LR test (Prob)    0.79  
(0.00)    0.77 
(0.00)    0.79 




2  0.43  0.40  0.57  0.37  0.28  0.38  0.55  0.33 
% Correctly Predicted    83.6%    82.4%    82.2%    80.5% 
Average Foreign Aid    5.95    5.46    55.92    37.76 
Predicted Probability ( ) 1 it ˆ P Y =     0.25    0.26    0.24    0.27 
Percentage Change in  ( ) 1 it ˆ P Y =     -14.8%    -18.1%    -1.67%    -2.22% 
Marginal Effect of average Foreign Aid     -0.037*** 
(0.000)    -0.047*** 




  -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Notes: 
1.  For each pair of regressions column (a) reports first-stage OLS estimates of foreign aid using White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix, see equation (1) in the text. Column 
(b) reports second-stage logit coefficients obtained from Maximum Likelihood estimation of equation (2), which models the probability that country i is democratic in year t. Estimation 
assumes random effects.   
2.  In columns (1a)-(2b) foreign aid is measured as a percentage of the recipient’s GDP (AID), whereas in columns (3a)-(4b) aid is measured in per capita terms (AID_PC). The estimates of 
columns (1a)-(1b) correspond to Dataset 1.a. The estimates of columns (2a)-(2b) correspond to the outliers-free Dataset 1.b. Specifications (3a)-(3b) correspond to Dataset 1.a plus 
Mongolia and Syria. Estimates of (4a)-(4b) correspond to Dataset 1.b minus Cape Verde, Israel and Malta (see Data Appendix for country coverage). In columns (4a)-(4b) all explanatory 
variables have been standardized. 
3.  Estimations correspond to the period 1967-2002. Values in parentheses denote standard errors unless otherwise indicated. *, **, *** correspond to statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. A constant term was included in all regressions. Marginal effects and Predicted Probabilities are estimated at the sample means of the explanatory variables. The 
percentage change in  ˆ P  is the percentage change in the Predicted Probability that the average-case country is democratic at time t in response to a one-unit increase in the amount of 
average foreign aid. The marginal effect of average foreign aid corresponds to the change in the Predicted Probability that the average-case country is democratic at time t in response to a 
one-unit increase in the amount of average foreign aid. For the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions the null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid instruments, 
i.e., uncorrelated with the error term and correctly excluded from the estimated equation obtained via Generalized Two-Stage Least Squares estimation.  
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ΤABLE 2.  
The effect of US Aid and Multilateral Aid on the political regime 
 
Variables  (1a)  (1b)  (2b)  (2b) 
US AID    -0.95     
  (1.88)     
Multilateral AID 
      -0.82** 
      (0.36) 
Initial GDP   -0.44***    -1.15***   
(0.12)    (0.19)   
Initial Population  -0.05    -1.32***   
(0.07)    (0.13)   
Sub-Saharan Africa 
0.18**    1.72***   
(0.08)    (0.26)   
Egypt 
1.76***    0.08   
(0.38)    (0.37)   
Central America 
0.46**    -1.12***   
(0.20)    (0.21)   
Franc Zone  -0.24**    -1.08***   
(0.11)    (0.31)   
Literacy Rate  -0.01***  -0.04  -0.05***  -0.09*** 
(0.00)  0.03)  (0.00)  (0.03) 
Trade Openness 
0.01***  0.01  0.00  0.00 
(0.00)  (0.02)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Military Expenditures  0.13***  0.05  -0.01  -0.06 
(0.03)  (0.34)  (0.02)  (0.23) 
Oil Exporting activity  -0.78***  -1.27  -0.59***  -2.75 
(0.14)  (2.61)  (0.15)  (2.02) 
Income inequality  -0.01  -0.15***  0.05***  -0.09 
(0.01)  (0.06)  (0.01)  (0.06) 
Muslim Dummy  -0.26***  -3.72***  -0.15  -4.56*** 
(0.07)  (1.37)  (0.15)  (1.34) 
Catholic Dummy   0.29**  2.13  1.18***  2.38* 
(0.11)  (1.49)  (0.19)  (1.28) 
Ethnolinguistic  
Fractionalization 
-0.18*  1.12  0.18  0.59 
(0.11)  (1.41)  (0.15)  (1.29) 
Latitude 
-0.02  0.46  0.16*  0.12 
(0.07)  (0.66)  (0.09)  (0.61) 
Post-Cold War Period  -0.06  1.24***  0.60***  1.57*** 
(0.14)  (0.39)  (0.22)  (0.43) 
Initial Political Regime 
0.05  7.13***  -0.63***  6.28*** 
(0.08)  (1.39)  (0.10)  (1.39) 
Predicted residuals 
  1.14    0.84** 
  (1.89)    (0.37) 
No of countries (observations)  61 (1585)  64 (1809) 
F-statistic of excluded instruments   14.96    60.77   
Sargan-Hansen Χ
2 statistic (Prob)    10.47 (0.06)    4.30 (0.51) 
Second-Stage Χ
2 (Prob)    210.84 (0.00)    225.15 (0.00)  
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ΤABLE 2. (continued) 
 
Rho - LR test (Prob)    0.80 (0.00)    0.79 (0.00) 
R
2 / Pseudo-R
2  0.19  0.33  0.44  0.40 
% Correctly Predicted    81%    83% 
Average Foreign Aid    0.73    2.00 
Predicted Probability ( ) 1 it ˆ P Y =     0.29    0.24 
Percentage Change in  ( ) 1 it ˆ P Y =     -10.34%    -40.42% 
Marginal Effect of average Foreign Aid     0.030 
(0.040)    0.097*** 
(0.010) 
       Notes: 
1.  For  each  pair  of  regressions  column  (a)  reports  first-stage  OLS  estimates  of  foreign  aid  using 
White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix, see equation (1) in the text. Column (b) 
reports second-stage logit coefficients obtained from Maximum Likelihood estimation of equation 
(2), which models the probability that country i is democratic in year t. Estimation assumes random 
effects. 
2.  In columns (1a)-(1b) US AID denotes Net Official Development Assistance provided by the United 
States, whereas in columns (2a)-(2b) Multilateral AID denotes Net Official Development Assistance 
provided by multilateral agencies, both as a percentage of the recipient’s GDP (for a listing of the 
agencies see the Data Appendix). Estimations correspond to the period 1967-2002. See also Table 1.   
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TABLE 3. The effects of a unitary change in aid as % of GDP on the probability  
of observing a democratic regime: Differential recipients and regimes 
 





( ) 1 it ˆ P Y =  
Marginal 
effect of AID 
% change in 
( ) 1 it ˆ P Y =  
1. Benchmark (variables at 
means, 1990-2002) 
Average political, economic 
and social conditions  0.30  -0.053*** 
(0.007)  -17.2% 
1.1. “Unfavorable” 
environment, 1990-2002 




0.05  -0.012*** 
(0.003)  -23.5% 
1.2. Intermediate environment, 
1990-2002 




0.44  -0.061*** 
(0.008)  -13.8% 
1.3.“Favorable” environment, 
1990-2002 




0.81  -0.038*** 
(0.008)  -4.7% 
2.1. Non-liberalized economies, 
1967-1999  Non-liberalized at t-5  0.22  -0.085*** 
(0.018)  -38.1% 
2.2. Liberalized economies, 
1967-1999  Liberalized at t-5  0.09  -0.013*** 
(0.004)  -13.3% 
 
Note: 
The estimates for groups 1, 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 are based on the outliers-free regression (2b) of Table 1. Standard 
errors are in parentheses.  
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ΤABLE 4. The effect of aid as % of GDP (AID) on the political regime: 
 Economic liberalization 
 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) 
AID  -0.49***  -0.26***  -0.12*** 
(0.10)  (0.06)  (0.03) 
Literacy Rate  0.00  -0.02**  -0.01 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Military Expenditures 
-0.06  0.23**  0.02 
(0.16)  (0.10)  (0.03) 
Oil Exporting activity 
-1.62*  -1.34***  -2.16*** 
(0.89)  (0.45)  (0.43) 
Income inequality  0.11**  0.13***  -0.06*** 
(0.05)  (0.04)  (0.02) 
Muslim Dummy  -0.98  -0.70*  -2.80*** 
(0.63)  (0.41)  (0.39) 
Catholic Dummy   3.38***  1.29***  1.01*** 
(0.49)  (0.43)  (0.27) 
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 
3.33***  -0.95***  0.78*** 
(0.45)  (0.36)  (0.25) 
Latitude 
3.70  -3.92**  4.53*** 
(2.29)  (1.99)  (1.12) 
Initial Political Regime  1.62***  2.09***  2.36*** 
(0.39)  (0.35)  (0.40) 
Post-Cold War Period  4.71***  4.14***  2.15*** 
(0.54)  (0.51)  (0.23) 
Economic Liberalization (t-5)  -2.94***     
(0.67)     
AID* Economic Liberalizations (t-5)  0.34***     
(0.09)     
Predicted residuals 
0.56***  0.34***  0.13*** 
(0.11)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
No of countries (observations)  44 (1081)  35 (682)  56 (889) 
F-statistic of excluded instruments  64.5  40.10  40.10 
Second-Stage Χ






Rho - LR test (Prob)  0.69 
(0.00)  -  - 
R
2 / Pseudo-R
2  0.28  0.30  0.47 
% Correctly Predicted  74.00%  81.53%  88.42% 
Average AID  5.50  5.45  5.45 
Predicted Probability ( ) 1 it ˆ P Y =   0.15  0.19  0.22 
Percentage Change in  ( ) 1 it ˆ P Y =   -32.47%  -20.81%  -9.43% 







Notes: Estimates correspond to the period 1967-1999 following data availability of the 
economic liberalization variable. Columns (1)-(3) are second-stage logit estimates. 
Specifications (2) and (3) correspond to the subset of observations for non-liberalized and 
liberalized economies, respectively. The chi-squared statistic of the Wald test for the null 
hypothesis on the equality of AID coefficients between specifications (2) and (3) equals 4.22 
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Appendix: The statistical model for the democracy-aid nexus 
In the Appendix we develop the econometric framework used to assess the impact of aid flows on the 
political regime. We adopt a binary response setup that can capture the non-linear pattern of the political 
developments and we follow Petrin and Train (2003) to incorporate the hypothesis that aid flows are 
determined endogenously.
1 Our setup also incorporates random effects to account for potential country-
specific unobserved features. In particular, assume that the political regime is described by a binary 
variable, Yit, which takes the values 0 or 1 if country i is autocratic or democratic respectively at time t. 
We then assume that these values are determined by an unobservable latent variable, 
*
it Y , that depends on 
various  country-specific  and  time-specific  characteristics,  including  foreign  assistance,  through  the 
following relationship: 
*
it Y  = αi + β AIDit + 
k ∑γk Xit + vit  (A.1) 
where AIDit denotes the measure of aid utilized as received by country i at time t, Xit includes a set of k 
observable characteristics of country i and vit
2 ~  (0, ) v N σ is an i.i.d. disturbance term. Assuming that the 
time-invariant term, αi, can be split into a constant part, α, and a random, country-specific part, µi, with 
µi
2 ~  (0, ) N µ σ , so that αi = α + µi, then (A.1) can be written as: 
*
it Y  = α + β AIDit + 
k ∑γk Xit + εit  (A.2) 
where εit = µi + vit with εit
2 2 ~  (0, ) v N µ σ σ +  and the random country-specific part, µi, is uncorrelated with 
the explanatory variables, i.e. Corr(µi, Xit) = Corr(µi, AIDit) = 0 for all t. Now, if foreign assistance that 
country  i  receives  at  time  t,  it AID ,  is  affected  by  unobservable  or  omitted  factors  captured  by  the 
idiosyncratic effects, εit, then  it AID  will be correlated with the error term. To account for the potential 
impact of aid endogeneity, we use here an Instrumental Variables methodology by following the control 
function approach suggested by Petrin and Train (2003). This approach decomposes the endogenous 
                                                           
1 Petrin A. and K. Train (2003): ‘Omitted product attributes in discrete choice models’, NBER Working Paper 9452.   3 
 
regressor, namely it AID , as a function of a set of exogenous instruments, g(wit) where wit is the instrument 
set, and omitted characteristics, uit, as follows: 
AIDit = g(wit) + uit  (A.3) 
In  our  case  Corr(AIDit,  εit)  ≠  0  ⇒  Corr(uit,  εit)  ≠  0  since  Corr(wit,  εit)  =  0,  thus  implying  that  the 
disturbance terms in the equations of aid and regime are correlated. In fact, the direction of the correlation 
is  not  obvious.  The  error  terms  will  be  negatively  correlated  if  donors  responded  to  negative 
democratization shocks by providing more assistance. On the opposite case, countries making progress 
towards  democratization  may  receive  favorable  treatment  from  donors,  thus  triggering  a  positive 
correlation between uit and εit. Given that Corr(uit, εit) ≠ 0, εit can be decomposed into a mean conditional 
on uit given by f(uit) called the ‘control function’ since it controls for the part of the original error term, εit, 
that is correlated with foreign aid, AIDit, and a deviation from the mean, ξit, which is orthogonal to AIDit. 
Following Petrin and Train (2003) and Villas-Boas and Winer (1999), we will assume that the control 
function is linear in the residuals of the form f(uit) = λuit.
2 Thus, we can then rewrite the regime function 
as: 
*
it Y  = α + β AIDit + 
k ∑γk Xit + λuit + ξit  (A.4) 
where ξit
2 ~  (0, ) N ξ σ  and i.i.d. The conditional probability of a country i being democratic can then be 
written as: 
Pr(Yit = 1AIDit, Xit, uit) = G
it it it
k
AID u κ α β γ λ
 
+ + +  
  ∑ X   (A.5) 
where G is the logistic function taking values between zero and one. The control function approach 
adopted here requires a two-stage estimation process. In the first stage, foreign aid is regressed on a set of 
instruments and the exogenous explanatory variables of the regime equation, Xit, whereas second-stage 
estimation involves a random-effects logit of Yit on AIDit, the predicted residuals of the first stage,  ˆit u , 
and  Xit.  This  two-stage  Maximum  Likelihood  procedure  yields  consistent  and  efficient  estimates 
                                                           
2 Villas-Boas J. and R. Winer (1999): ‘Endogeneity in brand choice models’, Management Science, 45, 1324–1338. 4 
 
compared  to  other  estimation  techniques  (Maddala,  1983,  p.  122-123).
3  The  random  effects  logit 
sacrifices less degrees of freedom as it requires
 substantially fewer parameters to be estimated than a 
typical fixed-effects  logit.  Thus, it is  more  efficient  when  the  number of  cross  sections  exceeds  the 
number of time units as in our case. Fixed-effects estimation also has the practical effect of precluding 
investigation of explanatory variables that change very slowly or not at all. This constraint leaves out 
democracy determinants such as geographic position, ethnic or religious identity or colonial origin. On 
the  contrary,  random  effects  estimation  controls  for  individual  time-series  and  cross-sectional  error 
components in the panel and it is strongly recommended in the context of the present empirical analysis, 
where several time-invariant democracy factors should be taken into account. These factors also capture a 
great proportion of the country-specific variation of democracy rates, thus mitigating the usefulness of a 
fixed-effects estimation scheme. We can then test for the endogeneity of AIDit by applying a Wald test on 
λ. Rivers and Vuong (1988) have shown that the two-step estimator is consistent and that the usual t 




                                                           
3 Maddala G.S. (1983): Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
4 Rivers D. and Q.H. Vuong (1988): “Limited Information Estimators and Exogeneity Tests for Simultaneous Probit 
Models”, Journal of Econometrics 39(3), 347-66. 5 
 
Table A1. Summary Statistics (Time Period: 1967-2002) 
 
  Dataset 1: Full Sample  Dataset 1.1. Initially Non-democratic countries 
  a. No restriction (Dataset 1.a)  b. Outliers-free Sample (Dataset 1.b)  No restriction   c. Outliers-free Sample (Dataset 1.1.c) 
Continuous Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
AID (%)  5.9  8.3  -0.5  95.0  5.5  6.5  -0.5  35.4  7.0  9.0  -0.5  95.0  6.8  7.5  -0.5  44.0 
US AID (%)  0.7  1.4  -0.2  25.7  0.5  0.8  -0.2  7.1  0.8  1.5  -0.2  25.7  0.6  0.8  -0.2  7.1 
Multilateral AID (%)  2.0  3.4  -0.6  45.7  1.9  2.9  -0.6  22.2  2.4  3.6  -0.6  45.7  2.3  3.1  -0.6  22.2 
Trade Openness (%)  65.6  39.0  6.3  251.1  58.5  33.0  6.3  198.8  65.9  36.6  6.3  251.1  60.5  32.2  6.3  198.8 
Literacy Rate (%)  75.1  22.3  11.7  99.8  74.1  23.0  11.7  99.8  72.0  22.7  11.7  99.8  71.5  23.4  11.7  99.8 
Income inequality (%)  46.5  4.7  31.4  59.1  46.5  4.1  34.7  58.9  47.0  4.5  33.2  59.1  46.7  4.3  33.2  58.9 
Military Expenditures (%)  3.3  3.6  0.0  20.3  2.3  1.5  0.0  7.0  3.4  3.8  0.6  20.3  2.4  1.7  0.6  7.0 
Latitude (0,1)  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.4  0.2  0.1  0.0  0.5 
Initial Population (log)  6.7  0.7  5.1  8.7  6.8  0.7  5.1  8.7  6.7  0.7  5.3  8.0  6.8  0.6  5.4  8.0 
Initial GDP (log) $ per 
capita 
2.9  0.5  2.0  4.7  2.8  0.5  2.0  3.8  2.8  0.5  2.0  4.7  2.7  0.4  2.0  3.8 
                                  Dummy variables (=1)    Obs  %       Obs  %       Obs  %       Obs  %    
Regime (Dep. Variable)    629  34.38      536  34.93      337  23.15      314  24.6
6 
 
Oil Exporting activity    229  12.50      107  7.02      195  13.42      74  5.87   
Muslim Dummy    571  31.22      415  27.06      515  35.34      396  31.0
8 
 
Catholic Dummy     630  34.44      534  34.80      412  28.28      350  27.4
8 
 
Ethnolinguistic Fractional.    1170  60.58      1058  68.90      921  63.15      882  69.1
4 
 
Sub-Sahara    367  20.08      332  21.66      354  24.31      320  25.1
3 
 
Central America    204  11.18      172  11.25      118  8.15      86  6.81   
Franc Zone    195  10.69      195  12.75      195  13.42      195  15.3
4 
 
Egypt    27  1.47      0  0.00      26  1.84      0  0.00   
Initial Regime    371  20.30      308  20.10      1460  100.0      1277  100.
0 
 
No of countries (N)  64  57  51  47 
No of observations (Obs)  1832  1537  1460  1277 6 
 




democratic  Time-trend added  Constraint on the 
executives added 
British Colonization 
dummy added  Polity 2 index 
Variables  (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b)  (3a)  (3b)  (4a)  (4b)  (5a)  (5b) 
AID    -0.35**    -0.35***    -0.53***    -0.27*    -0.30*** 
  (0.17)    (0.15)    (0.19)    (0.15)    (0.11) 
Initial GDP   -3.93***    -3.25***    -2.31***    -3.28***    -3.58***   
(0.57)    (0.43)    (0.46)    (0.50)    (0.46)   
Initial Population  -6.46*** 
 
-4.05***    -3.52***    -5.06***    -3.47***   
(0.47)    (0.26)    (0.25)    (0.43)    (0.22)   
Sub-Saharan Africa 
3.24***    3.80***    4.11***    3.15***    4.29***   
(0.54)    (0.47)    (0.50)    (0.57)    (0.46)   










         
Central America 
-4.85***    -3.32***    -2.78***    -3.94***    -3.10***   
(0.60)    (0.42)    (0.43)    (0.70)    (0.41)   
Franc Zone  -3.03***    -0.62    -0.68    -1.99***    -0.02   
(0.73)    (0.54)    (0.57)    (0.70)    (0.55)   
Literacy Rate  -0.10***  -0.13***  -0.08***  -0.07***  -0.09***  -0.09***  -0.08***  -0.05*  -0.07***  0.00 
(0.01)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.03)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
Trade Openness 
-0.01  -0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  -0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00 
(0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Military Expenditures  -0.66***  -0.58  -0.36***  -0.48  -0.22*  -0.15  -0.49***  -0.55  -0.25***  -0.13 
(0.12)  (0.43)  (0.10)  (0.35)  (0.12)  (0.38)  (0.11)  (0.34)  (0.10)  (0.25) 
Oil Exporting activity  -1.20***  -4.39  0.16  -1.83  -0.30  -2.02  1.63***  -1.85  -0.38***  -0.37 
(0.32)  (3.07)  (0.32)  (1.95)  (0.32)  (1.97)  (0.42)  (2.26)  (0.12)  (0.45) 
Income inequality  0.19***  -0.01  0.26***  -0.01  0.32***  0.09  0.28***  -0.01  0.29***  0.08 
(0.05)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.09)  (0.44)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.06) 
Muslim Dummy  3.02***  -2.84*  2.07***  -2.70**  1.66***  -3.29***  1.80***  -1.53  0.89**  -1.56*** 
(0.43)  (1.67)  (0.32)  (1.24)  (0.36)  (1.30)  (0.44)  (1.34)  (0.15)  (0.40) 
Catholic Dummy   4.23***  6.16***  3.00***  2.29*  1.93***  1.68  2.49***  3.41**  1.29***  -0.74* 
(0.48)  (2.01)  (0.35)  (1.26)  (0.39)  (1.34)  (0.48)  (1.45)  (0.16)  (0.41) 
Ethnolinguistic  
Fractionalization 
3.42***  3.93**  1.58***  1.06  1.81***  1.00  1.85***  1.49  0.91***  -0.18 
(0.47)  (1.81)  (0.35)  (1.30)  (0.38)  (1.30)  (0.38)  (1.35)  (0.18)  (0.45) 7 
 
ΤABLE A2. (continued) 
 
Latitude 
0.80***  1.73**  0.43**  0.50  0.32  0.17  0.34  0.74  0.83***  -0.24 
(0.27)  (0.77)  (0.20)  (0.63)  (0.22)  (0.66)  (0.24)  (0.62)  (0.22)  (0.44) 
Post-Cold War Period  0.84  1.43***      0.07  1.19*  0.48  1.19***  1.31***  3.04*** 
(0.60)  (0.51)      (0.47)  (0.66)  (0.48)  (0.40)  (0.28)  (0.33) 
Linear time trend      0.12***  0.29***             
    (0.02)  (0.03)             
Constraint on the Executive at 
Independence 
        -2.10***  0.10         
        (0.54)  (0.80)         
Prior colonization by the British              -1.81***  3.42*     
            (0.64)  (2.04)     
Initial Political Regime      -1.25***  5.20***  -0.98***  4.57***  -1.55***  4.22***  -2.05***  3.35*** 
    (0.20)  (1.31)  (0.22)  (1.34)  (0.25)  (1.33)  (0.24)  (0.78) 
Predicted residuals 
  0.36**    0.41***    0.60***    0.33**    0.30*** 
  (0.17)    (0.16)    (0.20)    (0.15)    (0.12) 
No of countries (observations)  47 (1278)  57 (1534)  52 (1392)  53 (1453)  53 (1449) 
F-statistic of excluded instruments  94.32    126.22    92.28    104.31    127.44   
Sargan-Hansen Χ
2 statistic (Prob)    6.50 
(0.17)    3.65 
(0.45)    4.38 
(0.36)    3.65 
(0.46)    8.21 
(0.08) 
Second-Stage Χ
2 (Prob)    157.04 
(0.00)    201.98 
(0.00)    173.56 
(0.00)    195.26 
(0.00)    217.39 
(0.00) 
Rho - LR test (Prob)    0.83 
(0.00)    0.76 
(0.00)    0.44 
(0.00)    0.74 




2  0.53  0.35  0.57  0.37  0.58  0.39  0.56  0.38  0.58  0.35 
% Correctly Predicted    83.1%    82.27%    83.05%    81.07%    78.54% 
Average AID    6.77    5.46    5.59    5.73    5.53 
Predicted Probability ( ) 1 it ˆ P Y =     0.13    0.26    0.22    0.22    0.40 
Percentage Change in  ( ) 1 it ˆ P Y =     -13.8%    -18.46%    -26.81%    -17.73%    -14.25% 
Marginal Effect of average AID    -0.018*** 
(0.003)    -0.048*** 
(0.005)    -0.059*** 
(0.006)    -0.039*** 




Specifications (1a)-(1b) correspond to Dataset 1.1.c. Specifications (5a)-(5b) are Hadi-outliers-free estimations and correspond to Dataset 1.a minus: Bahrain, Belize, Egypt, Iran, 
Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Namibia, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey (50 countries in total).8 
 
ΤABLE A3. The impact of aid as % of GDP (AID) on the political regime:  
Barro’s (1999) specification 
 
Variables  (1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b) 
AID    -0.51**    -0.38* 
  (0.21)    (0.22) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
2.62***    2.11**   
(0.91)    (0.90)   




   
Central America  -1.06*    -0.63   
(0.55)    (0.55)   
Franc Zone  2.43**    2.76**   
(1.09)    (0.90)   
5-year lag of dependent variable  -0.24  3.01***  -0.09  2.77*** 
(0.39)  (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.45) 
10-year lag of dependent variable 
    -0.31  0.87* 
    (0.48)  (0.46) 
Log(GDP)  -6.63***  -4.37**  -6.93***  -3.35* 
(0.95)  (1.87)  (0.97)  (1.99) 
Years of primary schooling  -0.20  0.32*  -0.21  0.24 
(0.22)  (0.18)  (0.22)  (0.18) 
Gap between male and female 
primary schooling 
-1.02**  -1.05***  -0.70  -0.83** 
(0.41)  (0.38)  (0.46)  (0.37) 
Urbanization rate  0.03  0.02  0.04**  0.02 
(0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Log(population)  -3.09***  -1.15  -2.85***  -0.67 
(0.45)  (0.73)  (0.45)  (0.74) 
Oil country dummy  0.07  0.23  -0.12  0.03 
(0.58)  (0.76)  (0.58)  (0.78) 
Predicted residuals 
  0.61***    0.47** 
  (0.22)    (0.24) 
No of countries (observations)  61(323)  61(323)  61(313)  61(313) 
F-statistic of excluded instruments  21.40    18.94   
Sargan-Hansen Χ
2 statistic (Prob)    10.05 
(0.07)    10.45 
(0.06) 
Second-Stage Χ
2 (Prob)    91.16 




2  0.59  0.33  0.59  0.33 
% Correctly Predicted    84.52%    84.87% 
Average AID    4.84    4.66 
Predicted Probability ( ) 1 it ˆ P Y =     0.275    0.304 
Percentage Change in  ( ) 1 it ˆ P Y =     -36.3%    -26.32% 
Marginal Effect of average AID    -0.101*** 
(0.038)    -0.080* 
(0.046) 
                                